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Abstract 
This paper describes piloted evaluation of enhanced propulsion control modes for emergency 
operation of aircraft. Fast Response and Overthrust modes were implemented to assess their ability to 
help avoid or mitigate potentially catastrophic situations, both on the ground and in flight. Tests were 
conducted to determine the reduction in takeoff distance achievable using the Overthrust mode. Also, 
improvements in Dutch roll damping, enabled by using yaw rate feedback to the engines to replace the 
function of a stuck rudder, were investigated. Finally, pilot workload and ability to handle the impaired 
aircraft on approach and landing were studied. The results showed that improvement in all aspects is 
possible with these enhanced propulsion control modes, but the way in which they are initiated and 
incorporated is important for pilot comfort and perceived benefit. 
Introduction 
Previous in-flight emergencies in which flight control has been partially or totally lost, have required 
pilots to learn how to fly the damaged aircraft, sometimes requiring innovative approaches. The use of 
differential thrust for maneuvering is an example that has been used successfully on several occasions 
(Refs. 1 to 4). Other examples of mid-air or on-the-ground crises, such as accidents caused by runway 
incursions or attempted take-offs from the wrong runway, have not ended well (Refs. 5 to 7). However, it 
has been speculated that in some cases there is a potential safety improvement possible through the 
incorporation of additional propulsion system capability (Ref. 8). 
The engines are the most powerful actuators on the aircraft, and have a large role to play in upset 
recovery and accident prevention. For instance, it is possible to use differential thrust to replace or 
augment the function of a damaged rudder and vertical tail. However, when using the engines alone for 
maneuvering, an aircraft can take as much as 5 to 10 times as long to respond compared to using the 
conventional flight control surfaces (Ref. 9). This lag in response is due to the relatively slower engine 
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dynamics; additionally, engine placement dictates the control authority the engines have on the aircraft. 
Besides the ability to maneuver and land a disabled aircraft, as demonstrated in the UAL 232 Sioux City 
accident (Ref. 1) and the DHL A300-B4 Baghdad event (Ref. 4), there are other more subtle capabilities 
of the flight control system that can be assumed by the propulsion system in case of an emergency, such 
as maintaining acceptable handling qualities (or at least aircraft stability). For instance, Dutch roll is a 
combined roll and yaw oscillation that is normally very lightly damped in swept-wing aircraft such as 
modern airliners. To increase the damping of the Dutch roll oscillations, a yaw damper is installed that 
measures the yaw rate of the aircraft and makes necessary commands to the rudder to compensate. In the 
event of vertical tail damage, the aircraft’s natural tendency to damp the Dutch roll oscillations is reduced, 
and with no rudder, the yaw damper will become ineffective. Previous NASA research aimed at using the 
throttles alone to maneuver an aircraft with no flight control system specifically identified sluggish engine 
response and Dutch roll as problems (Ref. 10). As a result of these findings, follow-on research to 
develop a propulsion-based automatic flight control system known as Propulsion Controlled Aircraft 
(PCA) was pursued (Ref. 11). This system proved successful in both alleviating much of the lightly 
damped aircraft behavior, and in reducing pilot workload.  
Another safety-enhancing feature that that has not been previously studied is the ability of the 
propulsion system to provide additional thrust beyond the normal maximum. This capability could be 
used to shorten the required take-off distance, for instance, in the case of an aircraft that mistakenly 
utilizes a runway that is too short. 
Research into achieving enhanced engine responsiveness to address these situations has revealed that 
the potential exists to greatly improve engine performance through control system modifications alone 
(Ref. 12) albeit with a slightly increased risk to the engine (Ref. 13). This risk is mitigated, however, by 
the overall safety improvement to the distressed vehicle (Ref. 8). In preparation to investigate the 
improvement in controllability and thus safety for the imperiled aircraft, enhanced propulsion control 
modes for emergency flight operation have been developed and demonstrated in simulation (Refs. 13 to 
15). Specifically, the two modes are Overthrust and Fast Response, which relate to emergency situations 
such as runway incursion and loss of flight control effectiveness, respectively. 
This paper describes on-going flight simulator evaluation of enhanced propulsion control modes as 
the pilot attempts to complete various tasks with an impaired aircraft, specifically with the rudder stuck in 
the neutral position. The intent is to begin to characterize the limitations of using the standard propulsion 
control available with the nominal or impaired aircraft, and the improvement achievable using the 
enhanced propulsion control modes. The performance improvements enabled by these modes have the 
potential to provide safety enhancements over using the nominal engines, whether for throttles-only 
maneuvering or as part of a specially designed flight control system such as PCA. The enhanced 
propulsion control modes are described in the next section. The remainder of the paper describes the 
results of several tests used to evaluate the effectiveness of the enhanced propulsion control modes, and 
their integration into the aircraft for ease of use. Based on these results, conclusions are drawn. 
Simulator and Enhancements 
The enhanced propulsion control modes were implemented for the engines (Ref. 12) of a nonlinear 
simulation of a four-engine transport aircraft. The engine performance is representative of actual engines 
in their thrust class (Ref. 16), and the enhanced control modes are realistically achievable. This simulation 
was incorporated into a fixed-base flight simulator that was developed to evaluate the impact of 
propulsion control innovations on flight operation. The cockpit (Figure 1) has two throttles which are 
used for the left and right side engines, meaning that the inboard and outboard engines on each side are 
always at the same power setting. The pilot has switches in the cockpit to turn the Overthrust and Fast 
Response modes on and off individually. The pilot can set the flaps and landing gear. The cockpit also has 
rudder pedals and a stick. There are no other controls. No wind was included in these tests. 
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Figure 1.—Flight simulator setup. 
Overthrust 
The impact of the Overthrust control mode is shown in Figure 2. The throttle position, which 
corresponds to the thrust setpoint, is moved higher than the normal 100 percent, and control limits that 
might otherwise be hit are relaxed to enable the engine to produce thrust beyond its normal maximum. In 
the figure, the initial power level corresponds to 100 percent thrust. At 10 s, Overthrust mode is initiated, 
resulting in the various overlaid transients up to higher thrust levels. Here each higher thrust level 
corresponds to a different level of risk of engine failure as the engine is pushed harder and harder. 
Fast Response 
The impact of the Fast Response control mode is shown in Figure 3. In this case, the engine is more 
responsive to large throttle changes because the limits that restrict acceleration have been adjusted to 
allow faster command following. The thrust response of an engine is typically restricted to accommodate 
the worst case stack-up of detrimental effects (inlet distortion, engine deterioration, engine-to-engine 
variation, Reynolds number effects, etc.) to avoid stall and surge (Ref. 9). If one is willing to accept 
higher risk of surge, or knows with certainty that the worst case situation does not exist, the engine can be 
allowed to accelerate more rapidly. 
Yaw Rate Feedback 
For some of the testing, a yaw rate feedback controller was implemented to aid or potentially replace 
the rudder function automatically, as opposed to manual manipulation of the throttles (Refs. 15 and 17). 
The approach taken was similar to that in Reference 15: Multiply the measured yaw rate signal by a gain 
k after it passes through a washout filter, and sum the result with the pilot’s pedal inputs. This signal is 
subsequently applied to the throttle settings differentially, as shown in Figure 4. (Note that the throttle 
setting is sometimes called Power Lever Angle or PLA.) This setup allows the pilot to maintain control 
over yaw rate using the pedals, and commands zero yaw rate when they are not depressed, which 
corresponds to a coordinated turn. As can be seen in Figure 4, the yaw rate error is applied to the engines 
on each side with equal but opposite magnitudes. On one side the throttle is increased, on the other it is 
decreased by the same amount. This maintains approximately the same total thrust, but applies a yawing 
moment to the aircraft, which can be used to help maneuver, or to oppose an undesired yaw rate 
disturbance. 
 
NASA/TM—2012-217698 4 
 
Figure 2.—Examples of Overthrust operation. 
Thrust levels reach various values above the 
normal maximum level as the setpoint is 
raised above 100 percent. The higher the 
thrust, the greater the risk of engine failure. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.—Fast Response transient 
showing the ability of the engine to 
accelerate more rapidly than normal 
when controller limits are relaxed. 
 
Figure 4.—Yaw rate feedback to differential throttle, where r is yaw rate and 
PLA is Power Lever Angle or throttle position. 
Results 
Three types of tests were conducted. The purpose of the first type was to evaluate the reduction in 
required takeoff distance obtained using Overthrust for a runway incursion scenario. The second type of 
testing involved turning with the rudder locked, using nominal and enhanced engine responses, with and 
without yaw rate feedback. The purpose of these tests was to evaluate Dutch roll damping and the ability 
to achieve a desired heading. Finally, the third type of testing assessed approach and landing attempts 
with a disabled rudder, again using a variety of control techniques. 
Runway Incursion 
For consistency during these tests, and to eliminate pilot anticipation, runway incursions were not 
simulated. Since runway incursions are relatively rare events, the pilot would not generally be expecting 
another aircraft to cross its path during takeoff. However, since the pilot knew it would happen here, even 
if the tests were randomized, it was decided to eliminate the human factor as much as possible and just 
begin the takeoff roll with Overthrust mode active. Thus from engine spool-up, the highest throttle setting 
corresponded to higher than normal takeoff thrust. It is intuitively clear that the required takeoff distance 
will be shorter with additional thrust, so the focus was on testing the improvement achievable through the 
use of this emergency control mode, and learning how to ascend in the shortest distance. In this scenario, 
three types of propulsion control were applied from the start of each respective run: Standard (not 
enhanced), Overthrust, and a combination of Fast Response and Overthrust. Piloted evaluation showed a 
clear improvement with Overthrust versus standard control, while the addition of Fast Response made no 
significant difference, which is to be expected since the fast response reduces the engine spool up time by 
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Figure 5.—Comparison of takeoff trajectories with standard 
control and enhanced control (Overthrust mode enabled). 
 
about 1 s (Ref. 13) over the approximately 40 s takeoff roll. Figure 5 shows a comparison of the results 
for standard control and enhanced control in terms of altitude vs. distance. While there is variation within 
each group of takeoffs, they are distinct groups with the required takeoff distance shorter by about 1000 ft 
for the set that used enhanced control. 
In an emergency situation, the pilot would have to determine the feasibility of using this control 
mode. If the plane has already reached takeoff decision speed (V1 speed) and cannot stop before impact, 
its use would be appropriate. In that case, however, the enhanced control mode would be initiated well 
into the takeoff roll and the distance advantage it provides would be less than seen in this study. On the 
other hand, under those circumstances, Fast Response might show more of a benefit than it did here. 
Turns 
Turns were used to evaluate the stability and controllability improvements made possible through the 
use of enhanced propulsion control. Two types of test were performed, one to assess Dutch roll damping, 
and the other to determine the pilot’s ability to achieve a desired heading. 
Turns Using Stick—Dutch Roll Damping 
The objective of this test was to evaluate the aircraft’s ability to damp Dutch roll without pilot 
intervention. For each trial, the pilot initiated the Dutch roll using the following procedure. He trimmed the 
aircraft at the desired altitude and speed, moved the stick hard over to the right and banked to 40°, turned 
right maintaining the roll angle, then rolled out at a desired heading by moving the stick hard over to the left, 
and then releasing with wings near level, thus causing the Dutch roll. There was some variation from trial to 
trial, but the starting point after Dutch roll initiation was similar in all cases. The cases included: 
 
• Nominal aircraft, no damage 
• Rudder stuck in neutral position with no compensation 
• Rudder stuck in neutral position with yaw rate feedback and nominal engines 
• Rudder stuck in neutral position with yaw rate feedback and fast-responding engines 
 
Some results are shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. The trials performed at 5000 ft, 200 kn (Figure 6), 
show that using yaw rate feedback provides a significant improvement in damping over the stuck rudder 
case with no yaw rate feedback, although none are as damped as the nominal case. There is no noticeable 
difference in the ability to damp between the fast-responding and nominal engines using yaw rate 
feedback, indicating that the nominal engines are fast enough. However, at 20,000 ft, 300 kn (Figure 7), 
while the extremes are the same, the fast-responding engines demonstrate a significant improvement in 
damping over the nominal engines when yaw rate feedback is used. This reveals that the nominal engines 
are not fast enough to damp the Dutch roll oscillations effectively in this case. 
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Figure 6.—Yaw rate at 5000 ft, 200 kn demonstrating similar yaw 
damping with nominal and faster engine. The pilot initiated a Dutch 
roll by using the stick to bank and turn, then roll out rapidly. 
 
 
Figure 7.—Yaw rate at 20,000 ft, 300 kn demonstrating improved yaw 
damping with faster engine. The pilot initiated a Dutch roll by using 
the stick to bank and turn, then roll out rapidly. 
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Turns Using Rudder Pedals 
The purpose of this test was to evaluate the controllability of the aircraft by testing the ability to 
maintain a desired heading when rolling out of a turn. For this test, the pilot used the stick together with 
the pedals, when the yaw rate feedback to the throttles was engaged, to bank and turn, then roll out at the 
desired heading. Figure 8 shows the results in heading and roll angle for the four cases. As usual, the 
nominal aircraft was very controllable and smooth, and the aircraft with the disabled rudder was much 
more oscillatory. When using yaw rate feedback to the throttles, the behavior is a little more oscillatory 
than for the nominal aircraft, regardless of engine response speed, particularly in roll, but is very 
controllable. The hunting at the end of the run for the final heading is mostly due to the pilot having to 
anticipate when to apply rudder to stop the turn; the faster engine stopped it too soon, while the nominal 
engine stopped it too late. 
Using the pedals seemed more successful in controlling heading than the use of yaw rate feedback 
without the pedals. This is likely due to the size of the command that the pilot was able to give with the 
pedals, and the speed with which he could modulate it, as well as his ability to anticipate. Although the 
pilot seemed to have good control during this maneuver when yaw rate feedback was engaged, he said 
that he was not comfortable using the rudder pedals in that way. He said that using the stick without the 
rudder pedals felt more natural, while using yaw rate feedback did not feel right dynamically. The pilot is 
used to nearly instantaneous response from the rudder, and although the engine response can be sped up, 
the inherent delay cannot be avoided altogether. He did not use rudder pedals for any other tests. 
Landing 
Several methods of testing landing were evaluated with the stuck rudder; the landing gear started in 
the lowered position in all cases. The pilot flew using the standard controls with compensation for the 
stuck rudder, and he used a throttles-only technique. All testing began from a trimmed condition. Locking 
the rudder in flight in such a case did not cause an upset and was transparent to the pilot. 
Landing Using Stick 
In this scenario, the crippled aircraft started out in stabilized flight pointed in the general direction of 
but offset laterally from the airport. The objective was to maneuver to the airport (Figure 9) and land 
(Figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 8.—Roll out at a heading of 270° after a bank and turn accomplished using rudder pedals and stick. These 
tests were performed at about 3000 ft, 250 kn. 
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The pilot flew using the stick; he did not attempt to use the rudder pedals. The flaps were set at 
50 percent. The tests included: 
 
• Rudder stuck in neutral position with no compensation 
• Rudder stuck in neutral position with yaw rate feedback and nominal engines 
• Rudder stuck in neutral position with yaw rate feedback and fast-responding engines 
 
These were blind randomized tests, during which the pilot did not know the type of engine response or 
feedback in use. He was very cautious about making or unwilling to make last minute corrections; he flew 
very conservatively. His comments after each flight indicated that he felt most comfortable without yaw rate 
feedback because he could better anticipate how the aircraft would react. He seemed to feel least 
comfortable with yaw rate feedback and fast response. These impressions are particularly interesting 
because in the best no-yaw-rate feedback case, when he was able to avoid initiating any significant 
oscillation, the results were no less oscillatory than the cases with yaw rate feedback and faster engines, and 
generally the compensation reduced oscillation significantly. Additionally, yaw rate feedback with faster 
engine response always provided the most damping and the smallest oscillations, while nominal engines 
with yaw rate feedback were often the least damped after the second turn. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show 
typical results for roll rate and yaw rate. What is clear is that after the first large turn, in the cases with yaw 
rate feedback the oscillations damp out much more quickly than without. After the second large turn, 
however, damping for the cases with yaw rate feedback with nominal engines was often worse than for the 
other cases. In all cases without significant oscillation, on final approach there is a persistent small Dutch 
roll, probably maintained by the tiny corrections required to land. Apparently, lining up with the runway 
was tricky in these runs, and poor orientation after the second turn often resulted in a difficult approach. 
Landing Using Throttles Only 
This scenario was the same as the previous one (Figure 9), except for the following: The pilot used 
throttles alone to maneuver, the flaps were set at 65 percent, and there was no yaw rate feedback. He did 
not use the stick, even though only the rudder was stuck. Landings were attempted with nominal and fast 
engines, and the pilot was aware of the control mode. The pilot flew conservatively, and was able to line 
up with the runway without too much difficulty in all cases. This difference in ease of lining up from the 
previous test using the stick is due to the slower, more sluggish behavior with throttles-only maneuvering 
that eliminated the tendency to over-control. With throttles only, final approach was much harder than 
initial alignment with the runway because the flight path adjustments had to be finer, and the pilot was 
careful not to overcompensate or accidentally initiate a large oscillation. He was able to achieve manageable 
roll and yaw rates (Figure 13 and Figure 14), although they were larger than he would have preferred. The 
 
 
Figure 9.—Ground track of impaired aircraft flying toward 
airport (CLE). 
  
Figure 10.—The pilot's view toward the airport (CLE) on 
approach. 
NASA/TM—2012-217698 9 
pilot felt that the faster engine response provided an advantage for fine tuning. Figure 15 and Figure 16 bear 
out the pilot’s claim. These figures show the time derivative of the throttle movements for similar 
approaches to emphasize the adjustments the pilot made. Though true for both throttles for the runs shown, 
for right throttle in particular (Figure 16), it is clear that the pilot made fewer, faster adjustments with the 
more responsive engines, while he made gentle adjustments more often with the nominal engines. Thus the 
faster engines provided about the same level of flight control with lower pilot workload. As with the other 
tests, skill tended to improve with practice. 
 
 
Figure 11.—Roll rate for landing trials using the stick. 
 
 
 
Figure 12.—Yaw rate for landing trials using the stick. 
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Figure 13.—Roll rate on final approach for throttles-only landing. 
 
 
 
Figure 14.—Yaw rate on final approach for throttles-only landing. 
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Figure 15.—Time derivative of movement of left PLA on approach for 
throttles-only landing. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.—Time derivative of movement of right PLA on approach for 
throttles-only landing. It is clear that the pilot made fewer, faster 
corrections with the faster engines, and smaller adjustments more often 
with the nominal engines. 
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The pilot seemed more comfortable using the throttles for fine tuning than attempting to fly normally 
with yaw rate feedback to the throttles. This preference was a result of the relatively slow engine response 
when compared to the rudder; the delay in engine response made small adjustments particularly difficult 
to accomplish. 
The general observations were that there is a clear learning curve in all cases. With practice the pilot 
was able to land safely more consistently, however, there was greater improvement when using the 
enhanced control modes. When the pilot had the ability to turn on and off the enhanced control modes, he 
tended to use Overthrust during flare, which he stated was very useful. Increasing power during flare was 
used to reduce sink rate. Normally, the stick would be pulled back to settle on the runway, but increasing 
power caused a similar effect. Therefore, Overthrust capability is considered generally useful for flying, 
not just for takeoff, when incorporated intelligently or when the pilot knows when to take advantage of it. 
This is the type of unanticipated benefit exposed by the creativity and resourcefulness of the pilot, and is 
reminiscent of what happened during the Baghdad event, in which the pilots of the disabled aircraft 
increased thrust during flare to obtain positive pitch (Ref. 4).  
General Impressions 
The pilot had several observations: 
 
• He preferred the throttle to the pedals because he felt he had finer control with the throttles. 
• He would have liked to have a sideslip indicator, which is not currently in the simulator’s 
instrumentation. The pilot might have been more willing to use pedals if there had been one 
available. 
• His assumption is that landing on airport grounds is as good as landing on a runway. The ground 
is hard-packed and relatively obstacle free. In real life, the landing gear may be torn off, but a 
survivable landing on the aircraft’s belly should be possible. 
• When landing, it is more important to keep wings level and hit a grassy area than try to maneuver 
onto a runway. Usually, maneuvering would result in an oscillatory behavior that continued until 
touchdown, resulting in a crash. 
• He tried to have a shallow approach under the glide slope. Steep approaches were harder to 
control and usually resulted in a crash. 
• Throttles-only control needed to be initiated from a stabilized and trimmed condition. 
Controllability depended on being able to adjust speed to climb or descend. 
• If the aircraft is not trimmed, it is very difficult (or impossible) to control the aircraft. Throttles 
alone cannot easily recover an unstable aircraft. 
• The goal was to land on a specific runway, but on approach he tried to minimize changes to flight 
path, so if another runway was more achievable, it would become the target. 
• It is important to watch airspeed during approach. If speed drops off and the aircraft enters into a 
stall, recovery is not possible because the aircraft is too low. This point is crucial because glide 
slope is controlled by airspeed. 
• Increasing power during flare was used to reduce sink rate. Normally, the stick would be pulled 
back to settle on the runway. Increasing power caused a similar effect, although more delayed so 
it requires more anticipation. 
• With Fast Response and Overthrust together, landings are easier because the flare is easier to time 
and to get the necessary power to reduce the sink rate.  
• Overthrust was hard to judge and control when used during flight. The difference in the 
sensitivity to pilot input between when it was on or off was more noticeable than for Fast 
Response. However, it is good for getting power during climb out, slowing sink rate during 
landing, and increasing speed when entering into a stall condition. The pilot’s difficulty with 
Overthrust mode during flight was due to its integration into the simulator. The throttle was 
rescaled for Overthrust to allow for a wider power range over the same range of throttle 
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movement. Because of this, the power level changed for a given throttle position with the mode 
on or off, and moving the throttle a fixed amount resulted in a different change in thrust. This 
took some getting used to. The implementation is a result of hardware limitations; it is not the 
desired approach. More instrumentation and more practice would be helpful with this mode in its 
current implementation. 
• There were no unusual dynamics reported as a result of turning the enhanced control modes on and 
off. The Fast Response mode only impacts engine transients, so its effect is not obvious unless the 
throttle is moved. Overthrust causes a rescaling of the throttle setting in the current implementation, 
which can result in a small transient when it is initiated, but since its purpose is to increase the high 
power setting, its use was most often in conjunction with a desired thrust increase. 
• Fast Response had a positive effect on control. Reducing the time lag associated with engine 
response makes it easier to control the aircraft by alleviating the need to anticipate as much. 
• There was trouble flying the simulator due to lack of visual cues and feel. There was no stick 
shaker to warn of the approach of stall, no ground effect during landing, no sound, and little 
instrumentation. In general, “sensing” of the aircraft was missing. 
• The aircraft was difficult to slow down so the speed needed to be kept low. At lighter weights 
there was not enough control authority in the throttles to slow it down because power was already 
reduced. Having a heavier aircraft helped because the throttles had to be set higher, providing 
more ability to retard them. 
• Fast Response has little benefit to improving performance during take-off, although its value is 
likely to increase the later into the takeoff roll it is initiated. It is most beneficial during throttles-
only flight control. 
• Overthrust was most beneficial during take-off and flare. It had limited benefit during throttles-
only flight control. 
Conclusions 
On-going piloted flight simulator evaluation of enhanced propulsion control modes was described. 
The development and testing of these control modes is in response to the shortcomings of throttles-only 
flight control identified previously by NASA researchers. The engine performance obtained using the 
enhanced control modes is representative for engines of this thrust class and is considered to be 
realistically achievable. Overall the piloted test results were very promising. The enhanced control modes 
showed benefit in multiple scenarios. Although the pilot had some reservations, it is important to realize 
that the purpose of these evaluations was to characterize situations in which the enhanced control modes 
would be useful, and ways of implementation that will take advantage of them without being detrimental 
to handling qualities. In addition to the use of enhanced propulsion control modes here, the testing 
performed under this effort differs from the previous work with throttles-only control and Propulsion 
Controlled Aircraft (PCA) in another way. Here only the rudder was failed so other surfaces were 
functional. The current problem is easier from that point of view, but the yaw rate feedback to the 
throttles combined with the remaining flight control system resulted in some uncertainty for the pilot that 
made the final approach difficult. He seemed to prefer no feedback during the fine tuning on approach as 
long as he was very careful not to excite oscillations. A yaw rate feedback implementation that is better 
integrated with the rest of the flight control system should improve pilot satisfaction. Additional work 
should include more tuning of feedback gains around the flight envelope to optimize performance, and 
evaluation of the resulting system in landing scenarios with crosswind conditions. 
All aircraft types and configurations respond differently, and behavior varies around the flight 
envelope. During this testing it was shown that fast responding engines were clearly better than nominal 
engines in some cases (e.g., Dutch roll damping at high altitude). It is likely that the benefit would be 
extended to a wider portion of the flight envelope, particularly landing, for some aircraft. A more 
intelligent and natural incorporation of these enhanced propulsion control modes is required so that the 
pilot is not surprised by performance changes. It may not be necessary to go to the extent of developing a 
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complete flight control system in the manner of PCA, but handling qualities should not worsen when the 
enhanced modes are initiated, and any risk accrued by their use should be more than offset by improved 
overall safety. 
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